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George W. Pugh* and
James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY
Other Crime Evidence-Penalty Phase of Capital Case-Necessity of
Prosecution's Giving Notice as to Intent to Offer Evidence of Other
Crimes
In State v. Hamilton,' despite negative answers by the prosecution
to defendant's discovery request about the prosecution's intent to in-
troduce other crime evidence, the prosecution in the penalty phase was
permitted to introduce very damaging evidence that several hours prior
to the charged crime, the accused had committed another armed robbery
(a crime for which he had not been convicted). In a forceful opinion
authored by Justice Lemmon, the majority of the court held that under
the circumstances the failure to give notice of the other crime evidence
constituted reversible error necessitating retrial of the penalty issue. After
noting that the Louisiana Constitution requires that an accused be no-
tified of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, Justice
Lemmon stated:
The defendant's constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him at trial under La. Const. Art.
I § 16 (1974) would be severely impaired if the defendant were
not informed within a reasonable time before trial that he must
be prepared to meet evidence relating to crimes other than the
charged crime. Moreover, fundamental fairness dictates that an
accused receive adequate prior notice that evidence of unrelated
criminal activity may be offered by the prosecutor in an effort
to punish him for the charged crime.2
The writers fully agree.
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Julius B. Nachman Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** Member, Louisiana Bar. The authors express sincere appreciation to Grace Sorey
and Rosemarie Falcone for their valued assistance in the preparation of this article.
I. 478 So. 2d 123 (La. 1985).
2. Id. at 132.
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Other Crime Evidence-Specificity of Notice Required as to Other
Crime Evidence in Penalty Phase of Capital Case
In State v. Ward,3 the court held that in the penalty phase of a
capital case, a defendant is entitled to less specific notice than in the
guilt phase of the trial. Justice Lemmon in his concurring opinion took
the position that statements in bills of information charging such other
crimes are inadmissible evidence of the commission of those other crimes.
Further, Justice Lemmon opined that for evidence as to those other
crimes to be admissible, the evidence must be "clear and convincing."
The writers agree.
WITNESSES
Attacking Credibility-Bias, Interest, or Corruption-Significance of
Denial of Right of Confrontation
In State v. Nash,4 the Louisiana Supreme Court re-emphasized the
importance of the constitutional right of an accused to show the bias,
interest or corruption of a prosecution witness, and used exceptionally
strong language in announcing the relief to which an accused is entitled
if denied this basic right. Although the accused in Nash had been
permitted to show both the prior conviction of a critical prosecution
witness, and the witness's willingness to participate in a drug transaction
to which the accused was allegedly a party, the court held that it was
reversible error for the trial court not to permit the defense to go further
and show that at the time of the alleged crime, the witness, presumably
because of his participation in the drug transaction in question, was
subject to revocation of parole in another state and to criminal pros-
ecution in Louisiana. Underlining the importance of the right, Justice
Dennis, relying on United States Supreme Court authorities,, spoke for
a majority of the court: "Defendant was thus denied the right of effective
cross-examination, a constitutional error in the first magnitude which
no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure." '6 Perhaps
because of non-acquiescence in the broad sweep of this language re
reversible error on this issue, Justices Lemmon and Blanche, instead of
joining in the opinion, concurred in the reversal.
It should be noted that subsequent to the Louisiana Supreme Court
decision in State v. Nash, the United States Supreme Court in Delaware
3. 483 So. 2d 578 (La. 1986).
4. 475 So. 2d 752 (La. 1985).
5. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974); Brookhart v. Janis, 384
U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 1245 (1966); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S. Ct. 748 (1968).
6. 475 So. 2d 752, 756 (La. 1985).
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v. Van Arsdall,7 under analogous circumstances, rejected an automatic
reversal rule and instead applied a harmless error analysis. Whether a
majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court will now retreat from the
automatic reversal rule applied in this area in Nash remains to be seen.
Attacking Credibility-Bias, Interest, or Corruption
Another very interesting case in the area of bias, interest, or cor-
ruption is State v. Trahan.1 Six members of the court, speaking through
Chief Justice Dixon, found it reversible error for the trial court, in a
prosecution for aggravated rape, to exclude from evidence a tape re-
cording, made surreptitiously by the defendant's father, of a conversation
between defendant's father and the husband of the alleged victim, during
the course of which conversation the husband allegedly offered to "drop
the charges" in exchange for the payment of $75,000. Interestingly, in
Trahan the court did not advert to whether the reversal was necessarily
required as a matter of constitutional law.9 In advance of trial, the tape
recording of the conversation had been furnished to the prosecution by
the defense and had been played by the prosecutor before the alleged
victim and her husband. The prosecution and the defense took very
different postures with respect to the conversation. In its opening and
closing statements to the jury and in its development of the testimony
at trial, the prosecution took the position that the defendant's father
had approached the husband and had made an effort to bribe him. On
the other hand, the defense (whose attempt to offer the tape in evidence
had been unsuccessful) argued in part that the tape was relevant as
tending to impeach the testimony of the husband and alleged victim to
show bias, interest or corruption.
At trial the husband had denied making an offer to the Trahans.
Although denying any complicity in any such offer, the wife had admitted
in her testimony that she and her husband had discussed dropping the
charges in return for a payment of money, "but added that she never
seriously considered accepting the money."' 0 Although the defendant in
his testimony at trial admitted that he had had sexual relations with
the alleged victim, he claimed that she had consented to the act.
In the opinion of the writers, the supreme court was clearly correct
in finding reversible error in the trial court's refusal to permit the jury
to hear the tape recording; the tape recording was very relevant to the
credibility of the husband and the alleged victim. If the husband and
the alleged victim had in fact been willing to "drop" the criminal charges
7. 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
8. 475 So. 2d 1060 (La. 1985).
9. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
10. 475 So. 2d at 1062.
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for such a payment, the believability of their trial testimony is sub-
stantially weakened. The tape recording was splendid evidence as to the
exact nature of the conversation, and the writers agree that it should
have been admitted.
PRIVILEGE
Instruction by Trial Court as to Existence of Testimonial Privilege
In State v. Ward," a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not commit error in refusing to instruct an
accused's wife that she had a privilege not to testify against her husband.
The supreme court stated that except as to the privilege against self-
incrimination, no such instruction is required by Louisiana statute or
jurisprudential rule. In a concurring opinion, Justice Lemmon took the
position that at least when requested to do so, the trial court should
instruct the accused's wife that she could not be compelled to testify
against her husband.
In the opinion of the writers, the position taken by Justice Lemmon
is eminently sound. Only a brief statement by the trial court would
have been sufficient to clarify the matter and make clear to the witness
what the law in fact is. Statements of the law by defense counsel to
the witness wife might not have appeared to her authoritative, and it
would have been a simple matter for the trial court to have informed
the witness as to her legal rights. Although no positive pronouncement
of Louisiana statute or jurisprudential rule so dictated, none then or
now prohibits a trial court, when requested by defense counsel, to instruct
a witness as to the existence of a privilege, and it is to be hoped that
in the future, trial courts will follow the salutary procedure suggested
by Justice Lemmon. The Ward case was not, however, an attractive
case for the adoption of such a rule, and Justice Lemmon concluded
that the refusal in that case to so instruct should be regarded as harmless
error. 12
Reporter Privilege-Scope of Privilege and Procedural Protections
Available to Reporter
In re Burns3 is one of the rare cases reaching the appellate courts
of Louisiana relative to the reporter privilege. 4 Although the circum-
II. 483 So. 2d 578 (La. 1986).
12. Justice Lemmon stated "the tenor of her testimony demonstrated that this error
by the trial judge was also harmless.'" Id. at 592. The accused was on trial for killing
the wife's stepfather, and according to the court, had sexually abused the witness wife
and her children. The wife on the witness stand testified that she felt the accused, her
husband, should be electrocuted because he "messed up a lot of lives." Id. at 585.
13. 484 So. 2d 658 (La. 1986).
14. La. R.S. 45:1452 (1982) provides: "Except as hereinafter provided, no reporter
[Vol. 47
EVIDENCE
stances surrounding the case are not altogether clear, it would seem that
a newspaper carried certain information about an alleged confession by
a person accused of murder. At the behest of the accused individual,
the trial court held a hearing "for the purpose of revoking the reporter's
privilege against compulsory identification of 'any informant or any
source of information obtained by him from another person while acting
as a reporter' contained in R.S. 45:1452."" At the hearing, counsel for
the accused questioned the reporter as to whether the source for the
newspaper story "was an individual employed by the clerk of court."1 6
When the reporter, claiming privilege, refused to answer, the trial court
held that the privilege was inapplicable because the question put to the
reporter did not go to the "source" of the story as required by the
statute, but only to "information on the source's employment."' 7 The
trial court found the reporter in contempt and sentenced him to jail.
The Louisiana Court of Appeal denied writs and the Louisiana Supreme
Court, granting writs, reversed the trial court. The supreme court held
that the reporter privilege extends not merely to the actual name of the
source of the reporter's story, but to "any disclosure of information,
such as place of employment, that would tend to identify him."' 8 Fur-
ther, the court held that the procedural safeguards provided for reporters
claiming the privilege 9 were applicable-i.e., the reporter was to have
"the right to appeal the ruling of the trial court without fear of a
contempt conviction or imprisonment" 2" pending the decision on appeal.
2
'
shall be compelled to disclose in any administrative, judicial or legislative proceedings or
anywhere else the identity of any informant or any source of information obtained by
him from another person while acting as a reporter." La. R.S. 45:1453 (1982) provides:
In any case where the reporter claims the privilege conferred by this Part,
the persons or parties seeking the information may apply to the district court
of the parish in which the reporter resides for an order to revoke the privilege.
In the event the reporter does not reside within the state, the application shall
be made to the district court of the parish where the hearing, action or proceeding
in which the information is sought is pending. The application for such an
order shall set forth in writing the reason why the disclosure is essential to the
protection of the public interest and service of such application shall be made
upon the reporter. The order shall be granted only when the court, after hearing
the parties, shall find that the disclosure is essential to the public interest. Any
such order shall be appealable under Article 2083 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure. In case of any such appeal, the privilege set forth in R.S.
45:1452 shall remain in full force and effect during pendency of such appeal.
15. 484 So. 2d at 658.
16. Id. at 659.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. La. R.S. 45:1453 (1982).
20. 484 So. 2d at 659.
21. In so holding, the court apparently equated the appeal provided by La. Code
Civ. P. art. 2083 with an application for writs.
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Noting that since the trial court hearing, the informant had come forth
and revealed his own identity, instead of remanding the case to the trial
court for it to determine whether revelation of the source was "essential
to the public interest," the supreme court itself reversed the reporter's
contempt conviction.
An intriguing aspect of the case concerns the standing of the accused
to invoke the trial court hearing in the first instance. Arguably the trial
court, under its inherent power, 22 is authorized sua sponte, or on the
suggestion of either the prosecutor or the accused, to order such a
hearing.
HEARSAY
Business and Public Records-Need for Firsthand Knowledge
In Griffin v. Succession of Branch,23 plaintiffs, claiming to be il-
legitimate children of the decedent, asserted an interest in the succession.
To prove that they were children of the decedent, plaintiffs attempted
to introduce in evidence records of the Department of Health and Human
Resources containing an entry by an unavailable social worker that the
decedent had affirmed, inter alia, that the claimants were his children.2 4
Reversing the position taken by the trial court and the court of appeal,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the records were admissible
under either the business records or public documents exception to the
hearsay rule. Under the circumstances, the writers agree. Although the
supreme court does not discuss the fact that the person providing the
information to the entrant was not himself an employee (and traditionally
lack of firsthand knowledge of the entrant would be fatal to the avail-
ability of such an exception), 25 it appears that the circumstance that the
out-of-court declaration to the employee itself also qualified for ad-
missibility under an exception to the hearsay rule or as non-hearsay (as
a declaration against interest or as an admission) resolves what otherwise
may have been an insurmountable bar to admissibility. 26
22. La. Code Crim. P. art. 17 provides:
A court possesses inherently all powers necessary for the exercise of its
jurisdiction and the enforcement of its lawful orders, including authority to
issue such writs and orders as may be necessary or proper in aid of its juris-
diction. It has the duty to require that criminal proceedings shall be conducted
with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to so control the
proceedings that justice is done. A court has the power to punish for contempt.
23. 479 So. 2d 324 (La. 1985).
24. Id. at 329; 452 So. 2d 344, 350 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984) (Ponder, J., dissenting).
25. See McCormick on Evidence §§ 306, 315 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as McCormick on Evidence]; State v. Nicholas, 359 So. 2d 965, 969 n.2 (La. 1978).
26. See Fed. R. Evid. 805 relative to admissibility of double hearsay.
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PRESUMPTIONS
Presumptions-Signification of Term in Criminal Statutes
One of the most amorphous terms in the law is "presumption."
Rather than have a precise, well understood meaning, it connotes dif-
ferent things to different people, including lawyers and judges, even in
the same context. 27 It is particularly disturbing when the user himself
cannot with precision define the specific signification intended by him.
Although in many legal contexts purposeful ambiguity may be very
desirable, unintended ambiguity, as we all know, can be very dangerous
indeed. When in a substantive criminal statute it is provided that fact
"A" is an essential element of a stipulated crime, and it is then stipulated
that proof of fact "B" creates a "presumption" of the existence of
fact "A" (or similarly that fact "B" is prima facie evidence of fact
"A"), what does such a formulation mean? Further, how does one
resolve the problems created by such language? 28
In State v. Lindsey,29 the Louisiana Supreme Court, in a well-
considered decision authored by Justice Dennis, wrestled mightily with
the problem and reached a conclusion that will have reverberating sig-
nificance as to a number of criminal statutes.3 0 At issue in Lindsey was
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:71, the well-known "worthless check"
statute, which makes it criminal to issue a check with intention to
defraud,3 ' and provides that the offender's failure to pay within ten
days following actual or constructive notice "shall be presumptive evi-
dence of his intent to defraud." What exactly is the meaning of the
quoted phrase? In Lindsey, the court agreed with the' trial court that
if the provision in question established a "mandatory presumption," it
would be unconstitutional.3 2 The court noted that "failure to pay a
27. "One ventures the assertion that 'presumption' is the slipperiest member of the
family of legal terms, except its first cousin, 'burden of proof.' One author has listed
no less than eight senses in which the term has been used by the courts." McCormick
on Evidence § 342. For the latter proposition, the authors cite Laughlin, In Support of
the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 195, 196-207 (1953).
28. See County Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979).
29. 491 So. 2d 371 (La. 1986).
30. The decision itself lists a number of criminal statutes containing such provisions.
31. La. R.S. 14:71 (1986).
32. The court stated:
Mandatory presumptions are of two types: conclusive presumptions, which
remove the presumed element from the case altogether if the state proves the
basic predicate facts; and mandatory rebuttable presumptions, which relieve the
state of the burden of persuasion on the presumed element unless the defendant
persuades the finder of fact not to make such a finding.
491 So. 2d at 374.
19861
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
worthless check within ten days of constructive notice of its nonpayment""
does not necessarily indicate that the instrument was originally issued
with intent to defraud; there may be a number of other plausible
explanations. Although frankly recognizing that what the legislature
intended in using the formulation employed is doubtful, the supreme
court, following a well-known guide to statutory interpretation designed
to save statutes from constitutional attack, interpreted the act as creating
a "permissive" rather than a "mandatory" presumption.14 Thus inter-
preted, Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:71 authorizes, but does not require,
the trier of fact to infer the intention to defraud from the fact of
nonpayment within ten days under the circumstances. Of great signifi-
cance, the court stressed that a similar interpretation is henceforth to
be given to the use of the word "presumption" (and "prima facie
evidence") in similar criminal statutes. The court notes that such an
interpretation departs from prior rulings." The decision is an important
one and bears a careful reading by all concerned. Presumptions and
burden of proof will be the subject of treatment in a forthcoming issue
of this Review.
33. Id. at 373.
34. For a lucid discussion of permissive and mandatory presumptions, see McCormick
on Evidence §§ 342, 346, 347.
35. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 400 So. 2d 575 (La. 1981), and State v. McCoy,
395 So. 2d 319 (La. 1980).
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